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Abstract
Under a cutoff policy, taxpayers can either report income as usual and run the risk of being
audited, or report a “cutoff” income and hence pay a threshold tax that guarantees not being
audited. Whereas the mainstream literature in this field assumes risk neutrality of taxpayers – with
some notable exceptions like Chu (1990) and Glen Ueng and Yang (2001) – this paper assumes
risk aversion instead: taxpayers have a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function
and differ in terms of their relative risk aversion coefficient and income. The novel contribution of
this work is that, under certain conditions, the cutoff is accepted by taxpayers with intermediate
characteristics in terms of income and relative risk aversion. Contrary to the standard result in
the literature, a full separation of types (the rich who accept the cutoff versus the poor who refuse
it) does not arise. However, our results confirm that the cutoff policy violates equity, as only
some taxpayers directly benefit. Nonetheless, the perception of this drawback may in practice be
obfuscated because that exclusion does not necessarily affect only the poor.
JEL Classification Numbers: H260, D890, K420.
Key words: cutoff, tax evasion, relative risk aversion.
1 Introduction
Under a cutoff policy, the Tax Administration audits, with a given probability, each taxpayer reporting
income below a given threshold; no audit takes place, instead, of taxpayers whose income report
meets the threshold. If taxpayers are risk-neutral, and the expected sanction for evasion large enough,
the effect of the cutoff rule is that taxpayers whose income (and thus whose tax1) is lower than the
threshold pay their tax due, thereby risking audits, while those who owe tax equal to or higher than
the threshold pay the threshold tax and avoid audits. The overall payments made by taxpayers are non
decreasing in income. Many different aspects of this approach have been examined in the literature
(see, e.g., Reinganum and Wilde, 1985, Scotchmer, 1987, Cremer, Marchand and Pestieau,1990,
Sanchez and Sobel 1993, and, for a generalization, Chander and Wilde, 1998), where it is by and large
considered as an efficient strategy in agency models in which the Tax Administration as a principal can
commit to a given audit policy. The cutoff rule entails efficiency gains as long as it secures savings in
terms of audit costs that exceed the revenue losses in taxation. It has, however, been criticized from an
equity point of view, because it introduces a regressive bias, as taxpayers’ payments strictly increase
in income only until the threshold level.
∗Dept. of Public Policy and Public Choice Polis, Università del Piemonte Orientale; e-mail fabio.privileggi@unipmn.it
1For the sake of simplicity the income tax is described as a function of reported income, disregarding possible differ-
ences between reported (gross) income and net taxable income due to exemptions, deductions etc.
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While the aforementioned literature focusses upon the efficient design of the whole tax system,
including the choice of tax rates, penalties etc., Chu (1990) studies the cutoff policy as a reform
that can be applied to actual tax systems. He assumes that taxpayers are risk averse, while the tax
rate and the enforcement parameters are given and are such that the expected yield of tax evasion
is positive. Chu shows that the introduction of a scheme implementing the cutoff policy2 gives rise
to a Pareto improvement. In fact, when taxpayers evade and are risk averse, the cutoff system can
play a role which is impossible under risk neutrality: that of collecting risk premia for the insurance
against audits provided by the cutoff. This characteristic may render the cutoff policy profitable even
disregarding the benefits in terms of reducing the number of (costly) audits to be run. On the other
hand, the cutoff policy still implies a regressive bias.
The Chu model has been generalized by Glen Ueng and Yang (2001). They show that the lump
sum nature of the threshold tax implies that the cutoff is also efficiency improving when income
depends on the labor-leisure choice of the agent. Moreover their approach allows for heterogeneous
preferences. The authors, however, do not investigate thoroughly along this direction, thus failing
to ascertain some aspects specifically related to heterogeneity of preferences. In their brief mention
to the heterogeneous framework (Remark 1, p. 88) it is implicitly assumed that the highest income
taxpayer contributes the highest expected tax revenue (including sanctions) in a standard tax system.
This feature, that they show to hold under homogeneous preferences, is implicitly maintained also
when preferences are heterogeneous (see also note 9, p. 93). In the latter case, however, the expected
tax revenue depends on both the taxpayer’s income and on her preferences, and thus a monotonic
relationship between expected tax revenue and income might not hold any more. If this possibility is
taken into account, the design of a Pareto improving cutoff policy becomes more demanding in terms
of information: it is not enough to rely upon data pertaining to the income distribution. Preferences
must be considered as well. Moreover, in this more general model, the consequences of the cutoff
policy in terms of equity also deserve a closer examination.
In this paper, by building upon the models of Chu (1990) and of Glen Ueng and Yang (2001), we
aim at studying the cutoff policy by explicitly taking into consideration heterogeneity of preferences.
We assume that taxpayers differ in relative risk-aversion coefficient and in income, which are treated
as exogenous continuous variables. To overcome the technical difficulties that ensue, the taxpayers’
utility function is assumed to be CRRA (Constant Relative Risk-Aversion). We believe, however,
that this loss of generality with respect to the Glen Ueng and Yang model, which refers to the whole
family of utilities exhibiting risk-aversion, is adequately compensated by our main finding (Propo-
sition 1), which heavily exploits the advantage of having a measure of heterogeneity of preferences
expressed by means of relative risk-aversion coefficients. Moreover, such parametrization allows for
the representation of a continuum of taxpayers, thus enabling us from this point of view to follow a
more general approach3 with respect to Glen Ueng and Yang, who assume a finite set of taxpayers.
The main new finding of this work pertains to the reaction of taxpayers who are requested to
make a cutoff payment larger than the tax they would pay under the standard tax rule. We show that
acceptance of the threshold tax among this group might leave aside two tails: the poorest with high
risk-aversion and the richest with low risk-aversion. Hence the cutoff policy introduces a trade-off
between efficiency advantages (Government revenue increases thanks to taxpayers’ voluntary pay-
ments) and negative effects in terms of equity. The latter, however, differ from those pointed out in
previous models, which predict that the cutoff policy is accepted by (all) the richest.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the taxpayer’s problem with reference
2The so called FATOTA scheme provides that taxpayers can either pay a fixed amount of taxes (FAT), being exempted
from tax audits, or pay taxes as usual, running the risk of tax audits (TA).
3The continuum representation is mainly followed in the literature; see, e.g., Chander and Wilde (1998), who shortly
review the previous studies.
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to both the optimal income report and the conditions needed for acceptance of a cutoff proposal.
In Section 3 we characterize those who pay the threshold tax, in terms of both true income and
relative risk-aversion. Section 4 contains two examples that illustrate the main result of Section 3.
Section 5 discusses the relevance of our result: while the drawbacks in terms of equity introduced
by cutoff programs already known in the literature are confirmed, our contribution provides a more
detailed and complex scenario in which emerges that equity is not being affected, as widely assumed,
monotonically; specifically, when taxpayers are heterogeneous and have CRRA preferences some
rich taxpayers may not benefit from the cutoff. Finally, the whole Section 6 is devoted to the technical
proof of our main result.
2 The Taxpayer’s Problem
Consider an economy in which there is a continuum of taxpayers. The utility that each taxpayer
enjoys out of her exogenously given and non observable income w is assumed to be of the standard
CRRA form, with constant relative risk-aversion coefficient α:
u (w) =
w1−α − 1
1− α . (1)
In class (1) we also include the case α = 1 by taking u (w) = limα→1 (w1−α − 1) / (1− α) = lnw.
Hence, the taxpayers populating our economy are indexed by their relative risk-aversion coefficient
α > 0.
2.1 Facing the Standard Tax Rule
Let us examine the taxpayer’s optimal report, making reference only to general tax rules and setting
aside the cutoff policy for the moment. A proportional tax system is considered: the income tax is
given by t (y) = ty, where y denotes the reported income and 0 < t < 1. We also assume that the
sanction to be paid in case of audit4 is proportional to the amount of the evaded tax:
S (w, y) = (1 + s) t (w − y) , (2)
where s > 0 is a penalty rate.
As we rule out rewards to honest taxpayers by assumption,5 a taxpayer will report y ≤ w, where
w > 0 denotes the true income. A rational taxpayer who earned a true income w will choose to report
the income y∗ that maximizes her expected utility
Eu (y) =
(1− p) (w − ty)1−α + p [w − ty − (1 + s) t (w − y)]1−α − 1
1− α (3)
with respect to y, where 0 < p < 1 is the probability of detection. Note that, by considering u (w) =
lnw when α = 1, Eu (y) is well defined for all α > 0 and for all feasible y.
The feasible set contains values for y such that (1 + s) t (w − y) < w − ty; that is, we assume
that the taxpayer can always bear the loss in case of detected evasion. A lower bound for the feasible
4We maintain the standard assumption that detection of tax evasion occurs with probability 1 whenever the tax report
is false and an audit is run.
5This is also a standard assumption, even if the theory of optimal auditing provides reasons in favor of rewards to
audited honest risk-averse taxpayers (see Mookherjee and Png, 1989).
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reported income y is thus mw = [(1 + s) t− 1]w/ (ts). Since we are interested in a strictly positive
income report, y > 0, we shall assume that
(1 + s) t > 1. (4)
This implies that sanctions are large enough to exclude full evasion.6 Therefore, the feasible set of
values for the reported income y is the interval (mw, w], with mw > 0.
In accordance with empirical evidence, we assume that the tax system parameters have values
such that cheating in reporting income has a positive expected return. In other words, the expected
sanction is assumed to be less than the expected gain for each dollar invested in tax evasion:
sp < 1− p. (5)
Hence, the case of full compliance, y = w, is also ruled out, as can readily be seen by noting that the
limit of the marginal expected utility [Eu (y)]′ as y → w− is negative whenever (5) holds.
Since, on the other hand, limy→m+w [Eu (y)]
′ = +∞ and Eu (y) is strictly concave over (mw, w)
for all α > 0, there exists a unique (interior) value y∗, mw < y∗ < w, that maximizes the expected
utility, which is completely characterized in terms of F.O.C. applied to (3):
w − ty∗ − (1 + s) t (w − y∗)
w − ty∗ =
(
ps
1− p
) 1
α
. (6)
By solving (6) for y∗, the optimal reported income proves to be a fixed share of the taxpayer’s true
income w, which depends on the risk-aversion coefficient α:
y∗ =
(1 + s) t+
(
ps
1−p
) 1
α − 1
t
[
s+
(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
] w. (7)
Note that a higher risk-aversion implies a larger share. Unlike Glen Ueng and Yang (2001) approach,
in our setting a richer taxpayer (endowed with a larger w), might have a lower reported income if
her relative risk-aversion coefficient α is lower. The F.O.C. condition in (7) allows for a substantial
refinement of the representation of the population of taxpayers in the economy by adding a dimension
to their relative risk-aversion coefficient index α.
An inverse formulation of (7), which will be exploited later on, gives a relation expressing the
true income of (optimizing) taxpayers, which is private information, as a function of their relative
risk-aversion coefficient α for any given optimal report y∗:
w (y∗, α) =
[
s+
(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
]
ty∗(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
+ (1 + s) t− 1
. (8)
As can easily be checked, the function w (y∗, α) in (8) is strictly decreasing with respect to α.
6The literature that considers optimal income reporting under risk aversion has routinely focussed upon strictly positive
reports, see, e.g., Allingham and Sandmo (1972). For the role of the assumption (1 + s) t > 1 in order to ensure an internal
solution, also see the Appendix in Chu (1990).
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2.2 Introducing a Cutoff
Now, let us assume that the Tax Administration offers the possibility of paying the cutoff amount c in
order to avoid audits with certainty. To facilitate the description of the reaction to this proposal by a
taxpayer who would pay an amount ty∗ under general rules, let us break down c as follows:
c = ty∗ + x. (9)
Whenever x is negative, that is the cutoff is lower than the ordinary tax, the trivial implication is that
the taxpayer chooses the cutoff.7 On the contrary, if the taxpayer cannot afford paying x, that is:
x ≥ w − ty∗
she always prefers ordinary taxation.
We will focus upon the most interesting case: x is positive and the taxpayer can afford it. In this
case, the taxpayer will accept the offer if she is at least indifferent as to whether to pay the requested
amount c or to pay only ty∗ and risk an audit. Thus, for a given x > 0, she chooses to pay the
threshold tax if
[w − (ty∗ + x)]1−α
1− α ≥
(1− p) (w − ty∗)1−α + p [w − ty∗ − (1 + s) t (w − y∗)]1−α
1− α , (10)
where the additive constants − (1− α)−1 have already been dropped from both sides.
By jointly considering the optimal condition (8) and the threshold condition (10), we are led to
the following system:
w =
{[
s+
(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
]
ty∗
}/[(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
+ (1 + s) t− 1
]
(w − ty∗ − x)1−α
1− α ≥
(1− p) (w − ty∗)1−α + p [w − ty∗ − (1 + s) t (w − y∗)]1−α
1− α
(11)
The first equation of system (11) links the taxpayer’s true income w to y∗ according to (8) –
or, equivalently, according to (6). The second equation is the weak preference condition for paying
the threshold tax instead of reporting y∗ and risking an audit. All pairs (α,w) solving system (11)
characterize in terms of relative risk-aversion α and true income w the subset of taxpayers whose
optimal report is y∗ and who prefer to pay the threshold tax c although it is larger than the tax they
would pay under general rules.
In the following sections we will take the optimal report y∗ and the ‘premium’ x as given and α
and w as the unknowns and provide a characterization of the set of taxpayers accepting the cutoff.
3 The Main Result
By plugging the first equality in system (11) into the second inequality, after some tedious algebra we
obtain a single inequality where the unknown is the sole variable α:
x ≤ (1 + s) (1− t) ty
∗(
ps
1−p
) 1
α
+ (1 + s) t− 1
1−
[
1− p + p
(
ps
1− p
) 1−α
α
] 1
1−α
 . (12)
7The cutoff is always preferred as long as it is lower than ty∗ + p (1 + s) t (w − y∗), i.e., the expected payment in
terms of taxes and fines. While writing c = ty∗ + p (1 + s) t (w − y∗) + x would be preferable in order to highlight the
possible request of a risk premium, we choose a simpler breaking up of term c in (9) to ease algebraic reduction.
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Inequality (12) characterize all taxpayers with relative risk-aversion index α who (optimally) reported
income y∗ and choose to participate in the cutoff program for an extra amount x when 0 < t < 1 is
the tax rate, s > 0 is the penalty rate and 0 < p < 1 is the probability of detection under general rules.
For future algebraic convenience we introduce the following changes of parameters:
β =
x
(1− t) y∗ ; (13)
γ = ln
(
ps
1− p
)
; (14)
δ =
1
(1 + s) t
=
p
t [p+ (1− p) eγ ] . (15)
Parameter β transforms component x in percentage terms with respect to the reported income after
taxation under general rules, we shall assume β ≤ 1; γ is a transformation of the sanction rate s
which takes into account also the probability of detection p (γ and p will be the key parameters in our
analysis); finally, δ transforms the tax rate t and the sanction rate s and, by using (14), can be written
as a function of γ and the probability of detection p, a form that will be exploited in Section 6.
Consider the function of the sole variable α defined by
τ (α) =
1− exp
 ln
(
1− p+ peγ 1−αα
)
1− α

1− δ (1− e γα ) . (16)
Since, by l’Hôpital’s rule, limα→1
[
ln
(
1− p+ peγ 1−αα
)
/ (1− α)
]
= pγ, when α = 1 (16) boils
down to
τ (1) =
1− epγ
1− δ (1− eγ) .
In order to let τ be defined for all α > 0 we shall take into account the discussion on parameters x,
s, p and t developed in the the previous section, which translates into the following conditions which
will hold throughout the paper: 0 < β ≤ 1, γ < 0 and 0 < δ < 1. Specifically, γ < 0 follows from
(5) and δ < 1 is a consequence of (4).
The number τ (α) can be interpreted as the individual (percent) threshold value for the taxpayer
characterized by coefficient of risk aversion α: if β is smaller or equal to τ (α) such taxpayer opts for
the cutoff. Inequality (12) is thus equivalent to the following:
τ (α) ≥ β, (17)
whose solution set contains all taxpayers characterized by relative risk aversion coefficient α who
chooses (or are indifferent to) to pay the cutoff rather than incurring the risk of being audited when
the (percent) cutoff offered by the tax administration is β. Note that parameter β embeds the optimal
report in absence of cutoff, y∗, which, in turn, depends on the true income w; therefore, the only
relevant independent variable left is the relative risk aversion coefficient α representing heterogeneity
in the population of taxpayers.
For each given value 0 < β ≤ 1, inequality (17) defines the upper contour set of β for the
function τ ; our goal is to show that, under some conditions on the parameters, such upper contour
sets are intervals not necessarily having zero as their left endpoint. While we will be able to prove
that τ is quasiconcave in some cases [when values of β large enough, β > sup {τ (α) : α > 0}, are
allowed], in the general case we will establish the desired property of the upper contour sets only for
values of β not too large [β < sup {τ (α) : α > 0}].
The following technical assumption further restricts the admissible values of the parameters.
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A. 1 Parameters β and γ have values in the following ranges: 0 < β ≤ 1 and8 6/ (√3− 3) ≤ γ ≤
−2. Moreover, the probability of detection p and the tax rate t must satisfy
δ =
p
t [p+ (1− p) eγ ] ≤ 1 +
γeγ
(1− eγ)2 . (18)
Note that the RHS in (18) is less than 1 as γ is negative. By expliciting p, (18) assumes the
following more cumbersome form which separates parameter p from t and γ:9
p ≤
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
eγt
1−
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
(1− eγ) t
. (19)
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption A.1 holds true.
i) If γ = −2 and
β ≤ 1− exp
(−√3.9781p)
1− δ , (20)
then the upper contour sets of τ defined in (16) are intervals. For β large enough, such intervals
are disjoint from the origin, i.e., their left endpoint is strictly positive.
ii) If 6/ (√3− 3) ≤ γ < −2, then, for each β satisfying
β ≤
1− exp
{
2 ln [1 + (1 + γ/2) pγ]
2 + γ
}
1− (1− e−2) δ , (21)
the solution set of inequality (17) is a nonempty interval. Again, for β large enough, such
interval is disjoint from the origin, i.e., its left endpoint is strictly positive.
Section 6 is entirely devoted to the proof of Proposition 1.
Note that (21) is more restrictive than (20); specifically, as it will be seen in the proof, the RHS
in (21) is always less than sup {τ (α) : α > 0}. On one side this is sufficient for nonemptiness of the
solution of (17), but is not enough to establish that τ is quasiconcave.
4 Two Numerical Examples
Let us apply Proposition 1 for the following values of parameters: γ = −4.0644, p = 0.01, to which
corresponds a sanction rate s = (1− p) eγ/p ≃ 1.7, and t = 0.44. Assumption A.1 is satisfied as
δ = p/ {t [p+ (1− p) eγ ]} ≃ 0.8417 < 0.9277 ≃ 1 + γeγ/ (1− eγ)2. Since γ < −2, part (ii) of
Proposition 1 is involved and we have only to establish the upper bound for the (percent) cutoff value
given by condition (21): β ≤ β =
{
1− e 2 ln[1+(1+γ/2)pγ]2+γ
}/
[1− (1− e−2) δ] ≃ 0.1434; for example,
by (13), β corresponds to a value x = (1− t) y∗β ≃ 80.299 when y∗ = 1000. Therefore, any fixed
(percent) premium that satisfies β ≤ 0.1434 produces a nonempty interval – either of the form (0, αr]
8Note that 6/
(√
3− 3) ≃ −4.7321.
9As prescribed by (14), parameter γ actually contains parameter p in its expression; however, rather than being a
function of p, γ must be interpreted as a function of the original sanction rate s for any given value of p, and thus as a
parameter which is independent of parameter p itself. In this perspective, we can say that p and γ are “separated” in the
RHS of (19).
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or of the form [αℓ, αr] with αℓ > 0 – of relative risk-aversion coefficients characterizing agents who
pay the threshold tax. For example, with β = 0.13 (corresponding to x = 72.8 when y∗ = 1000), the
interval has αℓ ≃ 0.53 > 0 and αr ≃ 3.93 as endpoints, as shown in figure 1 where the function τ
defined in (16) is plotted for our values for the parameters. If y∗ = 1000 these two values, correspond
to a minimum true income10 w ≃ 1664 (corresponding to αr ≃ 3.93) and a maximum true income
w ≃ 3969 (corresponding to αℓ ≃ 0.53), which imply evasion (in terms of share of concealed income
when y∗ is reported) of around 40% and around 75% respectively.
0
0.05
0.1
0.13
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.53 1 2 3 3.93 5
α
β
τ
FIGURE 1: the solution set of inequality (17) for γ = −4.0644, p = 0.01, s = 1.7, t = 0.44 and β = 0.13.
Figure 1 shows that more than the statement of part (ii) of Proposition 1 is true; the shape of
function τ is striking: it is clearly a quasiconcave function, that is, its upper level sets are intervals for
all β ≤ max {τ (α) : α > 0} ≃ 0.26, not only for β ≤ 0.1434. However, we have not been able to
establish this property in general, at least for γ < −2. Only when γ = −2 and part (i) of Proposition
1 applies, and thus β turns out to be constrained by the much looser condition (20) rather than by
condition (21), it can be established that τ is actually quasi concave for some cases, as it may happen
that max {τ (α) : α > 0} is smaller than the RHS in (20).
For example, with γ = −2, p = 0.05, to which corresponds a sanction rate s = (1− p) e−2/p ≃
2.57, and t = 0.44, Assumption A.1 is satisfied as δ = p/ {t [p+ (1− p) e−2]} ≃ 0.6364 < 0.638 ≃
1 − 2e−2/ (1− e−2)2. Part (i) of Proposition 1 applies and the upper bound for the (percent) cutoff
value given by condition (20) is β ≤ β = [1− exp (−√3.9781p)]/ (1− δ) ≃ 0.9895. Figure 2
shows that max {τ (α) : α > 0} ≃ 0.23, well below β ≃ 0.9895; in this case part (i) of Proposition 1
can be restated by saying that the function τ is quasiconcave for these values of parameters.
10Recall that the true income of (optimizing) taxpayers as a function of their relative risk aversion α is given by (8).
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FIGURE 2: plot of the function τ for γ = −2, p = 0.05, s = 2.57 and t = 0.44.
5 Equity Considerations
If the solution set of inequality (17) is of the form (0, αr] – like, for instance, in the first example of
Section 4 whenever β . 0.06, as can be understood from Figure 1 – relatively rich taxpayers with
low risk-aversion, i.e., with α ≤ αr, pay the threshold tax, while relatively poor ones with high risk-
aversion, that is with α > αr, do not accept the cutoff. The latter prefer to submit their optimal report
y∗, which, by (7), conceals only a relatively small income amount, thereby risking audits. This result
can be explained as follows. As reported income y∗ approaches true income w for very risk averse
taxpayers, the expected sanction decreases, while the risk premium under a CRRA utility function
does not increase enough to counter the former effect.
If the solution set of inequality (17) is of the form [αℓ, αr] with αℓ > 0 – like in the first example
of Section 4 with β = 0.13 – in addition to the reaction just discussed, the cutoff is also refused by
taxpayers with a risk-aversion coefficient below some lower bound αℓ, whose optimal income report
y∗, again by (7), conceals a relatively large income amount. These taxpayers, too, prefer risking audits
rather than paying the threshold tax. In this case there are two groups of taxpayers who refuse the
cutoff when it includes a premium, one characterized by relatively high true income and the other by
relatively low true income. It is clear from both figures 1 and 2 that this last situation may happen only
if the premium component β is large enough, while, at the same time, sufficiently small to allow for
participation in the cutoff proposal, as part (ii) of Proposition 1 guarantees nonemptiness whenever
condition (21) is satisfied.
In other words, we conclude that, as intuition suggests, the set of participants in the cutoff program
shrinks as the premium asked by the tax administration to buy an insurance against the possibility
of being audited increases. However, the novel contribution of the present work is that, contrary
to conjectures hitherto formulated by the mainstream literature, such ‘shrinking’ does not follow a
simple monotonic pattern. Specifically, we have shown that, when taxpayers have CRRA preferences,
above some threshold value for β not only less and less poor taxpayers (identified by the decreasing
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right endpoint αr of relative risk aversion index which bounds the set of participants from above)
choose the cutoff because of its growing price, but also some (very) rich taxpayers characterized by
low risk aversion coefficients,11 0 < α < αℓ, start refusing the offer as well.
Therefore, our result confirms the widely accepted criticism toward cutoff programs: equity is
adversely affected. Nonetheless, such drawback assume a more multi-faceted pattern when taxpayers
are risk averse, heterogeneous and endowed with a CRRA utility function. We showed that, whenever
the cost of entering the cutoff is high enough, the well known regressive bias is mitigated by the refusal
of the cutoff by two tails of taxpayers, the relatively poor and the relatively rich, who do not receive
suitable insurance offers.
6 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 will be accomplished through several steps. First of all we restate inequal-
ity (17) – that is, (12) – in a more convenient form. By using (16) and rearranging terms in (17) we
get
ln
(
1− p + peγ 1−αα
)
1− α ≤ ln
{
1− β
[
1− δ
(
1− e γα
)]}
,
which is equivalent to the following system: ln
(
1− p+ peγ 1−αα
)
≤ (1− α) ln [1− (1− δ)β − δβe γα ] if 0 < α < 1
ln
(
1− p+ peγ 1−αα
)
≥ (1− α) ln [1− (1− δ)β − δβe γα ] if α > 1. (22)
Define f : R++ → R by
f (α) = φ (α) + ψ (α)− (1− p) , (23)
where12
φ (α) = exp
{
(1− α) ln
[
1− (1− δ)β − δβe γα
]}
, (24)
ψ (α) = −peγ 1−αα . (25)
Then system (22) – and thus inequalities (12) and (17) – can be written as{
f (α) ≥ 0 if 0 < α < 1
f (α) ≤ 0 if α > 1. (26)
The function f defined in (23) is a smooth function defined for all α > 0. Note that f equals
zero in α = 1 (corresponding to logarithmic utility in our model) for all values of parameters p, β,
γ and δ satisfying Assumption A.1; as a matter of fact, consistently with the algebraic manipulations
of inequality (17) required to obtain system (26), the point α = 1 is being explicitly excluded from
(26), as it does not carry useful information on its solution set. However, as the original function τ in
(16) is continuous in α = 1, this point must be taken into consideration. Since the solution set of (26)
is nonempty when f crosses the horizontal axis from above at α = 1, we shall include α = 1 in the
solution set as long as f ′ (1) ≤ 0.13
11Recall that, by (8), smaller values of α correspond to larger levels of true income w.
12Since γ/α < 0 for all α > 0, 1 − (1− δ) β − δβe γα turns out to be always positive and thus φ (α) in (24) is well
defined for all α > 0.
13More precisely, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a nontrivial – i.e., with positive Lebesgue measure –
solution set of (26) is f ′ (1) < 0.
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In principle, the condition f ′ (1) ≤ 0 does not rule out the possibility that the solution set is a dis-
joint union of intervals; in the rest of this section we shall prove that this cannot be the case whenever
Assumption A.1 and either condition (20) or condition (21) hold, regardless of the sign of f ′ (1). This
will be achieved by partitioning R++ into a number of subintervals and by studying monotonicity and
curvature properties of the two functions φ and ψ, defined in (24) and (25) respectively, over each
subinterval. First, we need some preliminary lemmas.
6.1 Preliminary results
We start by studying the function φ defined in (24). In the sequel we shall often split it into the
composition φ (α) = exp [g (α)], with
g (α) = (1− α) ln
(
A− Be γα
)
, (27)
where constants A and B are introduced in order to ease notation and are defined by:
A = 1− (1− δ) β, (28)
B = δβ. (29)
Note that, under Assumption 1, the following holds:
0 < B < A < 1. (30)
Moreover, also the function g will be sometimes written as the product g (α) = (1− α)h (α), where
h (α) = ln
(
A− Be γα
)
. (31)
Note that h (α) < 0 for all α > 0.
Lemma 1 Let Assumption 1 holds. Then g′ (α) > 0 for all α > 0, and thus the function φ is strictly
increasing.
Proof. g′ has the following expression:
g′ (α) = −h (α) + (1− α)h′ (α) , (32)
where
h′ (α) =
γBe
γ
α
α2
(
A− Be γα ) (33)
is clearly negative since γ < 0. As both h and h′ are negative, the lemma is true whenever α ≥ 1.
Hence, let us assume 0 < α < 1 and look for a lower bound for g′ which is independent of α.
We first compute a lower bound for h′. A direct computation of h′′yields:
h′′ (α) = − γBe
γ
α
α2
(
A− Be γα )
[
2
α
+
γ
α2
+
γBe
γ
α
α2
(
A− Be γα )
]
= −
(
2 +
γ
α
) h′ (α)
α
− [h′ (α)]2 .
Since by Assumption 1 γ ≤ −2, 2 + γ/α ≤ 0 holds for all 0 < α < 1 and thus h′′ turns out to
be strictly negative; that is, h′ is strictly decreasing and we can take h′ (1) = (A− Beγ)−1 γBeγ ,
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which is independent of α, as its lower bound. As 1 − α < 1 and h′ (1) < 0, the second term in
(32) is bounded from below by h′ (1). Moreover, since −h is an increasing function of α [recall that
h′ < 0], −h (α) > limα→0+ [−h (α)] = − lnA for all 0 < α < 1. Hence, g′ is bounded from below
by − lnA+ h′ (1), that is,
g′ (α) > − lnA + γBe
γ
A−Beγ , (34)
where the RHS is independent of α.
The first term in the RHS of (34) is positive, while the second term is negative; thus, now we
need to find conditions under which the RHS is nonnegative. Specifically, by expanding constants A
and B as in (28) and (29) respectively, we must find for what values of parameters p, β, γ and δ the
following inequality holds:
− ln [1− (1− δ) β] + γδβe
γ
1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ ≥ 0. (35)
Since it clearly holds (with equality) for β = 0, a sufficient condition is that the derivative with respect
to β of the LHS be nonnegative for all 0 < β ≤ 1. A direct computation yields
∂
∂β
{
− ln [1− (1− δ) β] + γδβe
γ
1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ
}
=
1− δ
1− (1− δ) β +
γδeγ
[1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ]2 ;
in order to guarantee that such expression is nonnegative, we rearrange terms and study the following
inequality:
1− δ
γδeγ
+
1− (1− δ) β
[1− (1− δ) β − δβeγ]2 ≤ 0. (36)
We now show that the second term in the LHS of (36) is increasing in β:
∂
∂β
{
1− (1− δ)β
[1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ ]2
}
=
(1− δ) [1− (1− δ) β] + [2− (1− δ) β] δeγ
[1− (1− δ) β − δβeγ]3 > 0,
as both the numerator and the denominator in the RHS are positive. Thus, an upper bound for the
LHS in (36) is obtained by letting β = 1:
1− δ
γδeγ
+
1− (1− δ)β
[1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ ]2 ≤
1− δ
γδeγ
+
δ
(δ − δeγ)2 =
1− δ
γδeγ
+
1
δ (1− eγ)2 .
Therefore, a sufficient condition for (36) is the following:
1− δ
γδeγ
+
1
δ (1− eγ)2 ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ δ ≤ 1 +
γeγ
(1− eγ)2 ,
which is condition (18) of Assumption 1. Since (36) is itself a sufficient condition for (35), which,
through (34), establishes that g′ (α) > 0 for 0 < α < 1, the proof is complete.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1 there is a unique value α̂ > 0 such that g′′ (α̂) = 0, g′′ (α) < 0 for
0 < α < α̂ and g′′ (α) > 0 for α > α̂; α̂ is the unique number satisfying14
α̂ = − γA
(2− γ)A− 2Be γα̂ . (37)
14The exact solution α̂ of (37) involves the Lambert W function (see, e.g., Corless et al., 1996); specifically, α̂ =
−γ/ [LambertW (−2Beγ−2/A)+ 2− γ].
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Useful bounds for the value of α̂, as functions of the sole parameter γ, are given by:
1
2
≤ γ
γ − 2 < α̂ <
γ
γ − 2 + 2eγ < 1. (38)
Hence, g is strictly concave for 0 < α < α̂ and it is strictly convex for α > α̂, while φ turns out to be
strictly convex for α > α̂, but no conclusion can be drawn on its curvature properties for 0 < α < α̂.
Proof. By using the notation (31), g′′ can be written as follows:
g′′ (α) = −h′ (α)
{
2 + (1− α)
[
h′ (α) +
2α + γ
α2
]}
. (39)
Since h′ < 0, it is enough to study the sign of the term in curly brackets, which is the same as that of
the following expression, obtained by using (33) and after rearranging terms:
ζ (α) = 2
(
A− Be γα
)
α + (1− α) γA. (40)
It is easily seen that any root α̂ of ζ must satisfy (37).
To show that α̂ is unique, firstly note that limα→0+ ζ (α) = γA < 0; moreover, since the first term
in the RHS of (40) is positive and γ < 0, ζ (α) > 0 certainly holds for α ≥ 1. Thus, it is sufficient
to establish that the function ζ defined in (40) is strictly increasing for 0 < α < 1. To see this, let us
differentiate it with respect to α:
∂
∂α
ζ (α) = 2
(
A− Be γα
)
− γ
(
A− 2
α
Be
γ
α
)
;
as the first term on the RHS is positive and γ < 0, we just need to establish that
A− 2
α
Be
γ
α > 0 ⇐⇒ e
γ
α
α
<
A
2B
(41)
for 0 < α < 1. As (∂/∂α)
(
e
γ
α/α
)
= − (e γα /α2) (1 + γ/α), the LHS of the last inequality is
increasing whenever 1 + γ/α < 0 ⇐⇒ α < −γ; but this is certainly the case since 0 < α < 1 and
γ ≤ −2. Thus, a sufficient condition for (41) is eγ < A/ (2B), which definitely holds since, by (30),
A/B > 1 and eγ ≤ e−2 < 1/2. This establishes uniqueness of the root α̂ satisfying (37).
Let us now turn our attention to the bounds in (38). As far as the lower bound is concerned,
note that, since −2Be γα̂ < 0 in the denominator of (37), α̂ > −γ (2− γ)−1 = γ (γ − 2)−1, and,
as γ ≤ −2, γ (γ − 2)−1 ≥ 1/2. The upper bound requires some more work. First note that α̂ =
−γA/ [−γA + 2 (A− Be γα̂ )] < 1, since −γA > 0 and 2 (A− Be γα̂ ) > 0. Hence, let us assume
0 < α ≤ 1. As −2Be γα is decreasing for 0 < α ≤ 1, a first upper bound for α̂ is given by
− γA
(2− γ)A− 2Beγ , (42)
which is independent of α. In order to let it be independent of parameters β and δ as well, we expand
constants A and B as in (28) and (29) respectively and differentiate with respect to β:
∂
∂β
{ −γ [1− (1− δ) β]
(2− γ) [1− (1− δ)β]− 2δβeγ
}
=
−2γδeγ
{(2− γ) [1− (1− δ)β]− 2δβeγ}2 ,
which is clearly positive. Hence, an upper bound of (42), and thus of α̂ as well, is given by (42) itself
evaluated at β = 1:
− γA
(2− γ)A− 2Beγ ≤ −
γ
2− γ − 2eγ ,
which is the upper bound in (38), and the proof is complete.
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Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, g′′′ (α) ≥ 0 for γ (γ − 2)−1 ≤ α ≤ 1, which, by condition (38) of
Lemma 2, implies that g′′′ (α) ≥ 0 for α̂ ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof. By using the notation (31), g′′′ can be written as follows:
g′′′ (α) = −3h′′ (α) + (1− α)h′′′ (α) ,
which, since
h′′ (α) = −h
′ (α)
α2
[
h′ (α)α2 + 2α+ γ
]
, (43)
h′′′ (α) = −h
′′ (α)
α2
[
2h′ (α)α2 + 2α+ γ
]
+ 2
α+ γ
α3
h′ (α) , (44)
can be expanded to
g′′′ (α) = −
{
3 +
1− α
α2
[
2h′ (α)α2 + 2α + γ
]}
h′′ (α) + 2
(1− α) (α + γ)
α3
h′ (α) ,
where (44) has been used. To study the inequality g′′′ (α) ≥ 0, we multiply the last expression by α2
and substitute h′′ (α) as in (43) to get:
{
3α2 + (1− α) [2h′ (α)α2 + 2α + γ]} h′ (α)
α2
[
h′ (α)α2 + 2α + γ
]
+ 2
1− α
α
(α + γ) h′ (α) ≥ 0,
which, multiplying both sides by α2/h′ (α) and recalling that h′ (α) < 0, reduces to{
3α2 + (1− α) [2h′ (α)α2 + 2α + γ]} [h′ (α)α2 + 2α+ γ]+ 2α (1− α) (α + γ) ≤ 0. (45)
In order to solve (45), first note that, since γ ≤ −2 and h′ < 0, for α ≤ 1 the second factor in
the first term of the LHS, h′ (α)α2 + 2α + γ, and the second term in the sum, 2α (1− α) (α + γ),
are negative and nonpositive respectively. Therefore, we only need to establish for what values of
0 < α ≤ 1 the first factor in the first term of the sum, 3α2 + (1− α) [2h′ (α)α2 + 2α+ γ], turns out
to be nonnegative; i.e., after substituting h′ (α) as in (33) and some rearrangements, we must solve
the following inequality:
α2 + 2α+ (1− α) γA+Be
γ
α
A− Be γα ≥ 0,
which, since A−Be γα > 0, is equivalent to(
α2 + 2α
) (
A−Be γα
)
+ (1− α) γ
(
A +Be
γ
α
)
≥ 0. (46)
We now show that the LHS of (46) is increasing in α. A direct computation of the derivative with
respect to α of the LHS leads to the following inequality:
(2α + 2)
(
A− Be γα
)
− γ
(
A+Be
γ
α
)
+
2 + γ
α
γBe
γ
α +
(
1− γ
α2
)
γBe
γ
α ≥ 0, (47)
where all terms on the LHS are positive but the last one. Since
∂
∂α
[(
1− γ
α2
)
γBe
γ
α
]
=
(−α2 + 2α+ γ) γ2Be γα
α4
< 0,
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as γ2Be
γ
α/α4 > 0 while −α2 + 2α + γ < 0 for γ ≤ −2, a lower bound for the LHS in (47) is given
by:
(2α+ 2)
(
A− Be γα
)
− γ
(
A+Be
γ
α
)
+
2 + γ
α
γBe
γ
α + (1− γ) γBeγ
≥ (2α+ 2)
(
A−Be γα
)
− γ
(
A+Be
γ
α
)
+ (1− γ) γBeγ
= 2α
(
A− Be γα
)
+ A+ (1− γ)A− (2 + γ)Beγ + (1− γ) γBeγ
≥ 2α
(
A−Be γα
)
+ A + (1− γ) (A+ γBeγ) , (48)
where in the second line we dropped the third term of the first line (being it nonnegative) and in the
fourth line we dropped − (2 + γ)Beγ ≥ 0. The first two terms in (48) are clearly positive; thus, as
1 − γ > 0, we want to establish that A + γBeγ > 0, or, equivalently, that −γeγ < A/B. Since,
by (30), A/B > 1, a sufficient condition is −γeγ < 1; as (∂/∂γ) (−γeγ) = − (1 + γ) eγ > 0 for
γ ≤ −2, it is enough that 2e−2 < 1, which is true. Hence, we have just established that the LHS of
(46) is increasing in α.
Therefore, in order to inequality (46) to hold true for γ (γ − 2)−1 ≤ α ≤ 1, it is sufficient that it
holds in α = γ (γ − 2)−1. By substituting α = γ (γ − 2)−1 in (46) and rearranging terms we get:
3γ − 4
γ − 2
(
A− Beγ−2)− 2 (A+Beγ−2) ≥ 0,
which is convenient to rewrite as
3γ − 4
γ − 2 ≥ 2
A+Beγ−2
A−Beγ−2 . (49)
As the LHS is strictly decreasing in γ, we can let γ = −2 into the LHS and get the following sufficient
condition for (49):
A+Beγ−2
A− Beγ−2 ≤
5
4
. (50)
In order to find an upper bound for the LHS in (50), we substitute the constants A and B as in
(28) and (29) respectively and differentiate with respect to β; after rearranging terms we get:
∂
∂β
[
1− (1− δ) β + δβeγ−2
1− (1− δ) β − δβeγ−2
]
=
2δeγ−2
[1− (1− δ) β − δβeγ−2]2 ,
which is clearly positive. Thus, we can set β = 1 in the LHS of (50) so to get
1 + eγ−2
1− eγ−2 ≤
5
4
,
which boils down to γ ≤ 2− ln 9 ≃ −0.197, which clearly holds under Assumption 1.
This is enough to establish inequality (46), which, in turn, is sufficient for inequality (45) to hold;
therefore, g′′′ (α) ≥ 0 for γ (γ − 2)−1 ≤ α ≤ 1 and the proof is complete.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 1, the function φ (α) defined in (24) is such that φ′′′ (α) > 0 for
α̂ ≤ α ≤ 1.
Proof. It is immediately seen that the third derivative of φ can be written as follows:
φ′′′ (α) = eg(α)
{
g′′′ (α) + 3g′′ (α) g′ (α) + [g′ (α)]
3
}
,
which is positive for α̂ ≤ α ≤ 1 as, by Lemma 3, g′′′ (α) ≥ 0 and, by Lemmas 1 and 2, also g′ (α) > 0
(and thus [g′ (α)]3 > 0) and g′′ (α) ≥ 0.
Now we turn our attention to the function ψ defined in (24).
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Lemma 4 Under Assumption 1, the following holds for the function ψ (α) = −peγ 1−αα defined in
(24):
i) ψ′ (α) < 0 for α > 0;
ii) ψ′′ (α) < 0 for 0 < α < −γ/2, ψ′′ (α) > 0 for α > −γ/2 and ψ′′ (−γ/2) = 0;
iii) ψ′′′ (α) < 0 for 0 < α < α˜, ψ′′′ (α) > 0 for α˜ < α ≤ −γ/2 and ψ′′′ (α˜) = 0, where
α˜ = −3−
√
3
6
γ. (51)
Note that, under Assumption 1, 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ ≤ −2 implies that15
0 < 1− 1/
√
3 ≤ α˜ ≤ 1. (52)
Thus, ψ is strictly decreasing, it is concave for 0 < α < −γ/2 and convex for α > −γ/2, while
its second derivative is decreasing for 0 < α < α˜ and increasing for α˜ ≤ α ≤ −γ/2.
Proof. Direct computation yields:
ψ′ (α) =
pγ
α2
eγ
1−α
α , (53)
ψ′′ (α) = −pγ
α4
eγ
1−α
α (2α + γ) , (54)
ψ′′′ (α) =
pγ
α6
eγ
1−α
α
(
6α2 + 6γα+ γ2
)
.
Condition (i) holds as γ < 0. Since − (pγ/α4) eγ 1−αα > 0, the sign of ψ′′ is entirely determined by
the sign of 2α + γ and condition (ii) follows accordingly. Similarly, as (pγ/α6) eγ 1−αα < 0, the sign
of ψ′′′ is entirely determined by the sign of 6α2 + 6γα+ γ2, which has the two roots−γ (3−√3) /6
and −γ (3 +√3) /6; since −γ/2 < −γ (3 +√3) /6, condition (iii) is established.
6.2 Case (i) of Proposition 1: γ = −2
In this section we start to assemble all the information gathered in the last section in order to prove
the first part of Proposition 1. First of all, notice that when γ = −2,−γ/2 = 1, and thus Lemma 4 (ii)
establishes that ψ is strictly convex for α ≥ 1; coupled with Lemma 2, which implies that φ is strictly
convex for α ≥ 1 as well, this is enough to guarantee that the function f (α) = φ (α)+ψ (α)−(1− p)
defined in (23) is strictly convex on [1,+∞). As f (1) = 0, this means that the solution of the
second inequality of system (26) is a nontrivial interval if and only if f ′ (1) < 0. Note that, as
limα→+∞ f (α) = +∞, any such interval is always closed and has 1 as its left endpoint.
More problematic is the analysis over (0, 1], that is, the study of the first inequality of system (26).
Recalling that, from (38) in Lemma 2, 1/2 < α̂ < 1, the idea underlying the proof is to partition (0, 1]
into two subintervals, (0, α̂] and [α̂, 1], and then exploit the monotonicity and curvature properties
which are specific for the functions φ and ψ on such subintervals, as established by the lemmas in the
previous section. We start with two lemmas which are specific for the scenario in which γ = −2.
Lemma 5 When γ = −2, if both Assumption 1 and condition (20) in Proposition 1 (i) hold, then the
function g defined in (27) has the property that g′ (α) < 1 for 0 < α ≤ α̂.
15Note that 1− 1/√3 ≃ 0.4226.
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Proof. By Lemma 2, g′ is decreasing on (0, α̂], thus g′ (α) < limα→0+ g′ (α) =− ln [1− (1− δ)β]
for 0 < α ≤ α̂. Hence we must show that − ln [1− (1− δ) β] ≤ 1 ⇐⇒ β ≤ (1− e−1) / (1− δ)
holds true. Since, by condition (20), β ≤ [1− exp (−√3.9781p)] / (1− δ), it is sufficient to show
that
1− exp (−√3.9781p)
1− δ ≤
1− e−1
1− δ ⇐⇒ p ≤
1
3.9781
.
A slightly stronger condition is p ≤ 1/4, which certainly holds under condition (18) of Assumption
1. As a matter of fact, by substituting γ = −2 into (19) – which is the expanded version of (18) – and
recalling that t < 1, we find that
p ≤ 0.08634t
1− 0.13534t ≤
1
4
<
1
3.9781
,
and the proof is complete.
Lemma 6 Under the same assumptions of Lemma 5, if 0 < α0 ≤ α̂ is a stationary point for the
function f defined in (23), f ′ (α0) = φ′ (α0) + ψ′ (α0) = 0, then a smooth function fU : (0, α0] → R
exists such that fU (α0) = f (α0), f ′U (α0) = f ′ (α0), fU (α) > f (α) for 0 < α < α0 and f ′U (α) > 0
for 0 < α < α0. In other words, an upper bound fU of f exists on (0, α0] such that fU is strictly
larger than f and it is strictly increasing on (0, α0).
Proof. Choose 0 < α0 ≤ α̂ such that f ′ (α0) = φ′ (α0) + ψ′ (α0) = 0. Define the first order
Taylor approximation of the function g defined in (27) at α = α0:
T0 (α) = g (α0) + g
′ (α0) (α− α0) .
By Lemma 2, g is strictly concave on (0, α̂], thus T0 is a strict upper bound of g on (0, α̂), and
therefore, also the function defined by
φU (α) = e
T0(α) = eg(α0)+g
′(α0)(α−α0) (55)
is such that φU ≥ φ on (0, α̂], with strict inequality on (0, α̂). Our goal is to show that the upper
bound of function f defined on (0, α̂] as
fU (α) = φU (α) + ψ (α) + (1− p) ,
is strictly increasing on (0, α0), that is,
f ′U (α) = φ
′
U (α) + ψ
′ (α) > 0 (56)
for 0 < α < α0.
From Lemma 4 (iii) we know that ψ′ is strictly concave on (0, α˜], where α˜ is given by (51), as
ψ′′′ < 0 for 0 < α < α˜, while it is strictly convex for α˜ < α ≤ −γ/2 = 1. When γ = −2,
however, α˜ = 1− 1/√3 < 1/2 < α̂ [see (38)]; therefore, we need to study separately the two cases
0 < α0 ≤ 1− 1/
√
3 and 1− 1/√3 < α0 ≤ α̂.
1. Assume that 0 < α0 ≤ 1− 1/
√
3 = α˜. Then ψ′ is strictly concave on (0, α0]; φ′U , however, it
is not, being it an exponential function, as can be seen by differentiating φU in (55): φ′U (α) =
g′ (α0) e
T0(α)
. Therefore, we shall linearize it by taking its first order Taylor approximation at
α = α0:
TL (α) = φ
′
U (α0) + φ
′′
U (α0) (α− α0) = g′ (α0) eg(α0) [1 + g′ (α0) (α− α0)] .
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Clearly, being φ′U a strictly convex function, TL is a lower bound for φ′U ; specifically: TL (α0) =
φ′U (α0) and TL (α) < φ′U (α) for 0 < α < α0. As TL is also linear, the function defined by
L (α) = TL (α) + ψ
′ (α) , (57)
turns out to be a strictly concave lower bound of f ′U , defined in (56), on (0, α0]: L (α) ≤
f ′U (α) for 0 < α ≤ α0. Hence, in order to establish that f ′U > 0 on (0, α0), it is suf-
ficient to show that L > 0 on (0, α0). By strict concavity of L, a sufficient condition is
that min {limα→0+ L (α) , L (α0)} ≥ 0. But, on one hand, as, by (53), limα→0+ ψ′ (α) =
limα→0+ (pγ/α
2) eγ
1−α
α = 0,
lim
α→0+
L (α) = lim
α→0+
[TL (α) + ψ
′ (α)] = g′ (α0) e
g(α0) [1− g′ (α0)α0]
is strictly positive since 0 < α0 < 1 and, by Lemmas 1 and 5, 0 < g′ (α0) < 1. On the other
hand, by construction, L (α0) = φ′ (α0) + ψ′ (α0), which equals zero by assumption. Hence
inequality (56) is established for 0 < α0 ≤ 1− 1/
√
3.
2. Now assume that α˜ = 1− 1/√3 < α0 ≤ α̂ and consider again the function L defined in (57),
which, while being strictly concave on (0, α˜], it turns out to be strictly convex on (α˜, α0] as, by
Lemma 4 (iii), ψ′ is. Our strategy is to extend the argument of the previous point to the whole
interval (0, α0] by showing that, under condition (20) in Proposition 1 (i), L must be strictly
decreasing over (α˜, α0]; therefore, provided that L′ (α) < 0 for α˜ < α ≤ α0, once again the
condition min {limα→0+ L (α) , L (α0)} ≥ 0 guarantees that inequality (56) holds also when
α0 > α˜. Hence, let us study the sign of the derivative of the lower bound L:
L′ (α) = T ′L (α) + ψ
′′ (α) = [g′ (α0)]
2
eg(α0) + 4
p
α4
e−2
1−α
α (α− 1) , (58)
where ψ′′ (α) have been expanded as in (54) computed for γ = −2. We must thus establish that
the RHS in (58) is strictly negative.
As α0 ≤ α̂ < 1, by definition (27) g (α0) < 0, and thus eg(α0) < 1, yielding [g′ (α0)]2 as
a first upper bound of [g′ (α0)]2 eg(α0); moreover, since by Lemmas 1 and 2 g′ is positive and
decreasing on (0, α̂], an upper bound of g′ (α0) is limα→0+ g′ (α) = − ln [1− (1− δ)β]. Thus,
an upper bound for the first term in the RHS of (58) is {ln [1− (1− δ)β]}2.
As far as the second term in the RHS of (58) is concerned, from Lemma 4 (iii) we know that ψ′′
is increasing for α > α˜; therefore a useful upper bound for ψ′′ is given by the number ψ′′ (α̂),
which, however, cannot be computed directly. Thus we shall instead employ the upper bound of
α̂ provided in (38) of Lemma 2 for γ = −2: γ/ (γ − 2 + 2eγ) = (2− e−2)−1. By substituting
(2− e−2)−1 in the argument of ψ′′ (α) in the RHS of (58), after some algebra we get:
ψ′′
(
1
2− e−2
)
=
(1− e−2) (2e−2 − 4)3 e−2(1−e−2)
2
p ≃ −3.9781p.
Using the two upper bounds just found, we get the following inequality which holds on (α˜, α0]:
L′ (α) = T ′L (α) + ψ
′′ (α) < {ln [1− (1− δ)β]}2 − 3.9781p;
hence, a sufficient condition for L′ < 0 on (α˜, α0] is {ln [1− (1− δ)β]}2 < 3.9781p, which
is condition (20) in Proposition 1 (i). This is enough for min {limα→0+ L (α) , L (α0)} ≥ 0 to
hold true also when 1− 1/√3 < α0 ≤ α̂.
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We have thus shown that inequality (56) holds for 0 < α < α0, where α0 can be any stationary
point of f in (0, α̂], and the proof is complete.
Corollary 2 Under the assumptions of Lemma 6, f can have at most one stationary point α0 in (0, α̂]
which must be a maximum, while there cannot be any stationary point which is a minimum for f in
(0, α̂]. Either f ′ (α) > 0 for 0 < α ≤ α̂, or (a unique) 0 < α0 < α̂ exists such that f ′ (α0) = 0; in
the latter case f turns out to be strictly increasing on (0, α0) and strictly decreasing on (α0, α̂].
Proof. First of all, note that limα→0+ f ′ (α) = − [1− (1− δ) β] ln [1− (1− δ)β] > 0; therefore,
if f has no stationary points on (0, α̂] it must be increasing over there. Now let us suppose that a
stationary point exists and argue by contradiction: let 0 < α0 ≤ α̂ be such that f ′ (α0) = 0 which is a
minimum point of f . But, by Lemma 6, an upper bound fU of f exists on (0, α0] such that fU (α0) =
f (α0) and fU (α) > f (α) for 0 < α < α0 which is strictly increasing on (0, α0); therefore, f itself
must be strictly increasing at least on a (left) neighborhood of α0, which contradicts our assumption.
The same argument rules out existence of multiple maxima on (0, α0] as well, since this would imply
the existence of stationary points which are minima among the maximum points.
Proof of Proposition 1 (i). Corollary 2 states that the function f defined in (23) is either increasing
or has at most one maximum point on (0, α̂]. Since, for γ = −2, α˜ = 1 − 1/√3 < 1/2 < α̂ < 1 =
−γ/2, Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 (iii) establish that both φ and ψ have positive third derivative on
[α̂, 1], and thus f ′′′ > 0 on [α̂, 1] accordingly. Finally, Lemmas 2 and 4 (ii) establish that both φ
and ψ are strictly convex for α ≥ 1, which implies that f is strictly convex on [1,+∞) as well.
By combining these three properties we deduce that the function f can be either increasing on all
(0,+∞), or it can have at most one maximum point α0 such that 0 < α0 < 1 and one minimum point
α1 such that α1 > α0. More specifically, α0 can either satisfy 0 < α0 ≤ α̂ or α̂ < α0 < 1, where the
number α̂ is defined in (37) of Lemma 2 and, by calculating the bounds in (38) for γ = −2, is such that
0.5 < α̂ < 0.5363; while α1 can either be such that α0 < α1 ≤ 1 or α1 > 1, depending on whether
f ′ (1) ≥ 0 or f ′ (1) < 0 respectively. Recalling also that f (1) = 0 and limα→+∞ f (α) = +∞, the
following possible scenarios can occur, all defining the solution set of system (26) as either the empty
set or an interval.
1. f is strictly increasing on (0,+∞) and thus it crosses the abscissa on α = 1 from below, i.e.,
f ′ (1) > 0; in this case system (26) has an empty solution set.
2. There is one maximum point 0 < α0 < 1 and one minimum point α1 for f such that α0 < α1 <
1 and f (α0) < 0; f crosses the abscissa on α = 1 from below, i.e., f ′ (1) > 0, and system (26)
has an empty solution set.
3. There is one maximum point 0 < α0 < 1 and one minimum point α1 for f such that α0 < α1 <
1 and f (α0) = 0; f crosses the abscissa on α = 1 from below, i.e., f ′ (1) > 0, and the solution
set of (26) is the singleton {α0}.
4. There is one maximum point 0 < α0 < 1 and one minimum point α1 for f such that α0 < α1 <
1 and f (α0) > 0; since α1 < 1, once again f crosses the abscissa on α = 1 from below, i.e.,
f ′ (1) > 0, and the solution set of (26) can be either
(a) the closed interval [αℓ, αr], with 0 < αℓ < α0 < αr < α1 < 1, or
(b) the left-open interval (0, αr], with 0 < α0 < αr < α1 < 1.
5. There is one maximum point 0 < α0 < 1 and the minimum point for f is α1 = 1; then
f ′ (1) = 0, and the solution set of (26) can be either
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(a) the closed interval [αℓ, 1], with αℓ > 0, or
(b) the left-open interval (0, 1].
6. There is one maximum point 0 < α0 < 1 and one minimum point α1 for f such that α1 > 1;
then f crosses the abscissa on α = 1 from above, i.e., f ′ (1) < 0, and the solution set of (26)
can be either
(a) the closed interval [αℓ, αr], with 0 < αℓ < α0 < 1 < α1 < αr, or
(b) the left-open interval (0, αr], with 0 < α0 < 1 < α1 < αr.
Since the six cases discussed include all possibilities, the proof is complete.
Figure 3 illustrates the last proof by showing some solution sets I of system (26) when γ = −2.
All figures has been plotted using the values of parameters employed in the second example of Section
4: γ = −2, t = 0.44 and p = 0.05; while parameter β takes decreasing values from figure 3(a) to
Figure 3(f). Figure 3(a) corresponds to case 1 in the proof, while figure 3(b) matches case 2: in both
cases the solution set is empty, I = ∅. Figure 3(c) shows case 3, in which I is the singleton {α0}.
Figure 3(d) explains case 4a, while figures 3(e) and 3(f) illustrate case 5a, in which α1 = αr = 1, and
case 6a, in which αr > 1 (and thus f ′ (1) < 0), respectively: all the last three cases produce a closed
interval as solution set, I = [αℓ, αr], with left endpoint αℓ strictly larger than zero. Finally, figure 3(f)
corresponds to case 6b, when the solution set is an interval which is left-open: I = (0, αr].
6.3 Case (ii) of Proposition 1: 6/ (√3−3) ≤ γ < −2
Since γ < −2 implies −γ/2 > 1, by Lemma 4 (ii) the function ψ defined in (25) turns out to be
concave on [1,−γ/2]; however, Lemma 2 states that the function φ defined in (24) is convex on
[1,−γ/2]. Since no information is available on the sign of φ′′′ on the interval [1,−γ/2] (note that
Corollary 1 holds only for α̂ ≤ α ≤ 1), if γ < −2 in principle nothing can be said on the behavior
of f defined in (23) on the interval [1,−γ/2]. The task of condition (21) in Proposition 1 (ii) is to
overcome this impasse by letting f to be, if not convex, at least quasiconvex on [1,+∞), so that its
lower contour sets are still intervals. Therefore, under condition (21), the analysis on [1,+∞) remains
the same as in the previous section. However, as we have seen in Section 4, there is a price to pay, as
condition (21) turns out to be much more restrictive than condition (20).
Lemma 7 Under Assumption 1, if condition (21) in Proposition 1 (ii) holds the function f defined
in (23) is quasiconvex on [1,+∞); specifically, the set {α ≥ 1 : f (α) ≤ 0} is always a nonempty
(nontrivial) closed interval.
Proof. Consider the following linear upper bound χ of function φ on [1,−γ/2]:
χ (α) = 1 +
exp
{(
1 +
γ
2
)
ln [1− (1− δ + e−2δ) β]
}
− 1
−
(
1 +
γ
2
) (α− 1) . (59)
As φ (1) = 1 and φ (−γ/2) = exp {(1 + γ/2) ln [1− (1− δ + e−2δ)β]}, χ is the expression of the
line defined by the two points (1, φ (1)) and (−γ/2, φ (−γ/2)). Since φ is strictly convex on [1,+∞),
χ is strictly larger than φ on (1,−γ/2).
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FIGURE 3: the solution set I of system (26) is either empty or a (possibly nontrivial) interval; in (a) and (b)
I = ∅, in (c) I = {α0}, in (d), (e) and (f) I = [αℓ, αr], while in (g) I = (0, αr].
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Define the upper bound f of f as follows:
f (α) =
{
f (α) if 0 < α < 1 and α > −γ/2
χ (α) + ψ (α)− (1− p) if 1 ≤ α ≤ −γ/2, (60)
where χ (α) is defined in (59). The function f defined in (60) is such that f (1) = f (1), f (−γ/2) =
f (−γ/2), f (α) > f (α) for 1 < α < −γ/2, and is strictly concave on [1,−γ/2]. Therefore, by
assuming that
χ′ (1) + ψ′ (1) ≤ 0, (61)
f turns out to be strictly decreasing on [1,−γ/2], which, since f (1) = f (1) = 0, in turns implies
that f (α) < 0 on (1,−γ/2]. Since, by Lemmas 2 and 4 (ii), f is strictly convex on (−γ/2,+∞),
condition (61) is thus sufficient to establish that f is quasiconvex on [1,+∞). Using (53) to evaluate
ψ′ (1) = pγ and after some algebra, (61) boils down to condition (21), and the proof is complete.
When γ < −2, however, something changes also on the left of α = 1. As a matter of fact, the two
constants α̂ and α˜ introduced in Lemmas 2 and 4 (iii) both increase as γ decreases, with α̂ increasing
faster than α˜, as the next lemma explains in detail. This reshuffles the arguments used in the previous
section also on the interval (0, 1], which thus need to be reassessed.
Lemma 8 Under Assumption 1, a unique value γ∗ < −2 exists such that α˜ = α̂ when γ = γ∗, α˜ < α̂
if γ∗ < γ < −2 and α˜ > α̂ if γ < γ∗, where α˜ and α̂ are defined in (51) and in (37) respectively.
Bounds independent of the parameters are given by:
−2.7497 ≃ −2
[
1√
3− 1 + exp
(
− 6
3−√3
)]
< γ∗ < − 2√
3− 1 ≃ −2.7321. (62)
Proof. By substituting α̂ with α˜, defined in (51), into the expression (37) and rearranging terms
we consider the following function of γ:
η (γ) = γ +
2√
3− 1 + 2e
−
6
3−
√
3
B
A
= γ +
2√
3− 1 +
2pβe
−
6
3−
√
3
(1− β) t [p+ (1− p) eγ] + pβ , (63)
where in the last equality the constants A and B have been expanded as in (28) and (29) respectively
and the definition of δ in (15) has been used. Direct computation yields:
η′ (γ) = 1− 2pβe
−
6
3−
√
3 (1− β) t (1− p) eγ
{(1− β) t [p+ (1− p) eγ ] + pβ}2 ,
which is clearly positive under Assumption 1. Thus, the function η defined in (63) is strictly increasing
in γ and it can have at most one root γ∗ in (−∞,−2], which solves η (γ) = γ + 2/ (√3− 1) +
2e
−
6
3−
√
3 (B/A) = 0. As 0 < B/A < 1, the bounds in (62) follow immediately.
Note that, since 6/
(√
3− 3) ≃ −4.7321, by (62) it is immediately seen that γ∗ > 6/ (√3− 3)
must hold.
By Lemma 8, α˜ ≤ α̂ if γ∗ ≤ γ < −2. This means that the argument developed through Lemmas
5 and 6 and in Corollary 2 in Section 6.2, and thus in the proof of Proposition 1 (i), carries over also
when γ∗ ≤ γ < −2; we only need to adjust Lemmas 5 and 6 in order let them hold also in this case.
The next Lemma actually generalizes Lemma 5 for all 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < −2 under condition (21)
in Proposition 1 (ii), while the following one, Lemma 10, is specific for the case γ∗ ≤ γ < −2.
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Lemma 9 When 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < −2, if both Assumption 1 and condition (21) in Proposition 1
(ii) hold, then the function g defined in (27) has the property that g′ (α) < 1 for 0 < α ≤ α̂, where α̂
is defined in (37).
Proof. Recalling the proof of Lemma 5, we must show that β ≤ (1− e−1) / (1− δ) holds true
also when γ∗ ≤ γ < −2. Under condition (21), it is sufficient to show that
1− exp
{
2 ln [1 + (1 + γ/2) pγ]
2 + γ
}
1− (1− e−2) δ ≤
1− e−1
1− δ ,
or, equivalently, that
1− δ
1− (1− e−2) δ
{
1− exp
[
2 ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]}
≤ 1− e−1. (64)
As (1− δ) / [1− (1− e−2) δ] < 1, a sufficient condition for (64) is
exp
[
2 ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]
≥ e−1 ⇐⇒ p ≤
2
(
e−
2+γ
2 − 1
)
(2 + γ) γ
. (65)
Condition (18) of Assumption 1, or, more precisely, condition (19), provides a useful upper bound
for p; since an upper bound for the RHS in (19) is obtained by letting t = 1 in its expression, we obtain
the following:
p ≤
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
eγt
1−
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
(1− eγ) t
<
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
eγ
1−
[
1 + γe
γ
(1−eγ)2
]
(1− eγ)
=
(1− eγ)2 + γeγ
(1− eγ) (1− eγ − γ) . (66)
Combining (65) and (66), it is easily seen that
2
(
e−
2+γ
2 − 1
)
(2 + γ) γ
>
(1− eγ)2 + γeγ
(1− eγ) (1− eγ − γ) (67)
holds true for all 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < −2, as can be checked by plotting both terms in (67) as
functions of the only variable γ with Maple software. As (67) implies both (65) and (64), the proof is
complete.
6.3.1 The argument when γ∗ ≤ γ < −2
The following Lemma exploits both Lemma 9 and condition (21) in Proposition 1 (ii) in order to
extend Lemma 6 to the case γ∗ ≤ γ < −2.
Lemma 10 Let γ∗ ≤ γ < −2. Under the same assumptions of Lemma 9, if 0 < α0 ≤ α̂ is a
stationary point for the function f defined in (23), f ′ (α0) = φ′ (α0) + ψ′ (α0) = 0, then a smooth
function fU : (0, α0] → R exists such that fU (α0) = f (α0), f ′U (α0) = f ′ (α0), fU (α) > f (α) for
0 < α < α0 and f ′U (α) > 0 for 0 < α < α0. In other words, an upper bound fU of f exists on (0, α0]
such that fU is strictly larger than f and it is strictly increasing on (0, α0).
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Proof. Since α˜ < α̂ if γ∗ < γ < −2, the first part of the proof, i.e., the case in which 0 <
α0 ≤ α˜, is exactly the same as in the proof of Lemma 6, one has only to replace 1 − 1/
√
3 with
α˜ = − (3−√3) γ/6 and use Lemma 9 instead of Lemma 5. Note that the same argument works also
in the special case γ = γ∗, in which α˜ = α̂.
As far as the second part is concerned, i.e., when γ∗ < γ < −2 and α˜ < α0 ≤ α̂, we must show
that under condition (21) in Proposition 1 (ii) the function L defined in (57) is strictly decreasing on
(α˜, α0]. To this purpose, let us study the sign of the derivative of L as in (58) for γ∗ < γ < −2:
L′ (α) = T ′L (α) + ψ
′′ (α) = [g′ (α0)]
2
eg(α0) − pγ
α4
eγ
1−α
α (2α + γ) , (68)
where ψ′′ (α) have been expanded as in (54). We must establish that the RHS in (68) is strictly
negative. We shall consider the same upper bounds for both the first and the second term in the RHS
of (58): {ln [1− (1− δ)β]}2 and ψ′′ [γ/ (γ − 2 + 2eγ)] respectively, where the argument of ψ′′ is the
upper bound of α̂ provided in (38) of Lemma 2. After some algebra we get:
ψ′′
(
γ
γ − 2 + 2eγ
)
= −p (γ + 2e
γ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)
γ2
.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for having the RHS in (68) strictly negative is
{ln [1− (1− δ) β]}2 − p (γ + 2e
γ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)
γ2
≤ 0,
which can be rearranged as follows:
β ≤
1− exp
[
−
√
p (γ + 2eγ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)/γ2
]
1− δ .
Under condition (21), it is thus sufficient to show that
1− exp
[
2 ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]
1− (1− e−2) δ ≤
1− exp
[
−
√
p (γ + 2eγ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)/γ2
]
1− δ ,
or, equivalently, that
1− δ
1− (1− e−2) δ
{
1− exp
[
2 ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]}
≤
1− exp
[
−
√
p (γ + 2eγ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)/γ2
]
.
Since (1− δ) / [1− (1− e−2) δ] < 1, a sufficient condition is
exp
[
2 ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]
≥ exp
[
−
√
p (γ + 2eγ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ)/γ2
]
,
which, after some algebra, is equivalent to
θ (p, γ) = p−
[
2γ ln (1 + pγ + pγ2/2)
2 + γ
]2
(γ + 2eγ) (γ − 2 + 2eγ)3 e−2(1−eγ) ≥ 0.
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Note that the LHS of the last inequality depends only on the two parameters p and γ; hence we can
label it as a function of two variables, θ (p, γ). Since its expression is too tough to handle analytically
we rely on graphic inspection by means of Maple software, which confirms that θ (p, γ) ≥ 0 for all
0 < p < 1 and γ < −2. This completes the proof as it is sufficient for condition (68) to hold true.
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) for γ∗ ≤ γ < −2. With Lemmas 9 and 10 replacing Lemmas 5
and 6 in Section 6.2, Corollary 2 still applies, and the proof remains identical to that for case (i) of
Proposition 1 on (0, 1]. Moreover, Lemma 7 extends the argument in the proof of Proposition 1 (i) also
on the interval [1,+∞) by establishing that, if condition (21) holds true, the set {α ≥ 1 : f (α) ≤ 0}
is always a nonempty (nontrivial) closed interval. Note that under condition (21) the solution set of
system (26) cannot be empty.
6.3.2 The argument when 6/
(√
3−3
)
≤ γ < γ∗
Clearly, γ < γ∗ implies −γ/2 > 1; thus Lemma 7 still applies and condition (21) in Proposition 1
(ii) guarantees that the function f defined in (23) is quasiconvex on [1,+∞), so that its lower contour
sets are intervals. However, when γ < γ∗ Lemma 8 states that the constants α̂ and α˜ defined in (37)
of Lemma 2 and in (51) of Lemma 4 (iii) respectively, are such that α̂ < α˜. Moreover, as γ becomes
smaller, the constant α˜ becomes larger, until it reaches the value α˜ = 1, which, by definition (51),
corresponds to the value 6/
(√
3− 3) for parameter γ. Hence, unlike the case γ∗ ≤ γ ≤ −2, now the
interval (0, 1] must be partitioned into the following three intervals:
(0, 1] = (0, α̂] ∪ [α̂, α˜] ∪ [α˜, 1] ,
with α̂ < α˜ ≤ 1.
While on (0, α̂] and, when α˜ < 1, on [α˜, 1] the arguments discussed in the previous sections still
apply, on [α̂, α˜] not only, as shown in Lemmas 2 and 4 (ii), the functions φ and ψ defined in (24)
and (25) are respectively convex and concave, but also their third derivatives have opposite sign, as
prescribed by Corollary 1 and 4 (iii). Therefore, the argument in the proof of case (i) of Proposition
1 does not apply anymore on [α̂, α˜]. We shall follow a new strategy in order to fill this gap: the next
lemma will establish that, if condition (21) holds, the function f turns out to be concave on [α̂, α˜].
Lemma 11 Let 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < γ∗. Under Assumption 1, if condition (21) in Proposition 1 (ii)
holds, then the function f defined in (23) is strictly concave for α̂ ≤ α ≤ α˜, where α̂ and α˜ are
defined in (37) and (51) respectively, and are such that α̂ < α˜ ≤ 1.
Proof. Since, by Corollary 1, φ′′′ > 0 for α̂ ≤ α ≤ 1, φ′′ (α) ≤ φ′′ (1) holds true whenever α̂ ≤
α ≤ 1. Also, since, by Lemma 4 (iii), ψ′′′ (α) ≤ 0 for 0 < α ≤ α˜, ψ′′ (α) ≤ ψ′′ (α̂) < ψ′′ [γ/ (γ − 2)]
whenever α̂ ≤ α ≤ α˜, where the last inequality uses the lower bound for α̂ in (38). Hence, a sufficient
condition for f ′′ (α) = φ′′ (α) + ψ′′ (α) < 0 on [α̂, α˜] is the following:
φ′′ (1) + ψ′′
(
γ
γ − 2
)
< 0,
which can be expanded as
− 2γδβe
γ
1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ + {ln [1− (1− δ)β − δβe
γ]}2 < (γ − 2)
3 pe−2
γ
, (70)
where the LHS has been obtained by substituting α = 1 in the expression of φ′′,
φ′′ (α) = eg(α)
{
g′′ (α) + [g′ (α)]
2
}
,
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with g, g′ and g′′ defined in (27), (32) and (39) respectively, and the RHS has been obtained by
substituting α = γ/ (γ − 2) in (54).
Let us search for some useful upper bound for the LHS in (70). First note that for γ < −2 the
following inequalities hold:
1
1− (1− δ) β − δβeγ <
1
1− (1− δ) β − δβe−2 ,
{ln [1− (1− δ)β − δβeγ]}2 < {ln [1− (1− δ)β − δβe−2]}2 ,
which provide a first upper bound. Next, note that the RHS in both inequalities above are strictly in-
creasing in β, therefore we can discard parameter β by taking its maximum value yielded by condition
(21), so that:
1− (1− δ)β − δβe−2 = 1− [1− (1− e−2) δ]β = exp{2 ln [1 + (1 + γ/2) pγ]
2 + γ
}
,
and thus an upper bound for the LHS in (70) is given by
−
[
2γδeγ
1− (1− e−2) δ
] 1− exp{2 ln[1+(1+γ/2)pγ]
2+γ
}
exp
{
2 ln[1+(1+γ/2)pγ]
2+γ
} +{2 ln [1 + (1 + γ/2) pγ]
2 + γ
}2
.
Finally, we need to get rid also of parameter δ; to this purpose, since it is immediately seen that
δ/ [1− (1− e−2) δ] is increasing in δ, condition (18) of Assumption 1 allows us to replace δ with
1 + γeγ/ (1− eγ)2, thus eventually providing our final upper bound for the LHS in (70):
−
{
2γeγ
[
(1− eγ)2 + γeγ][
(1− eγ)2 + γeγ] e−2 − γeγ
}
1− exp
{
2 ln[1+(1+γ/2)pγ]
2+γ
}
exp
{
2 ln[1+(1+γ/2)pγ]
2+γ
} +{2 ln [1 + (1 + γ/2) pγ]
2 + γ
}2
.
Since the RHS in (70) is increasing in p, there is no hope to discard parameter p from the whole
inequality; as a matter of fact, we shall rely once again on graphic inspection on the relevant ranges
for parameters γ and p. Recall that an upper bound for p is given by condition (19) of Assumption 1
computed in t = 1 [see also inequality (66) in the proof of Lemma 9]:
p <
(1− eγ)2 + γeγ
(1− eγ) (1− eγ − γ) = p (γ) . (71)
To conclude the proof, the plot by Maple software of the difference between the LHS and the RHS
of (70) as a function of the two variables γ and p shows that it is clearly positive for all the relevant
values, that is, on the ranges16 6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ ≤ 2/ (1−√3) and 0 < p ≤ p (γ), with p (γ)
defined in (71).
Proof of Proposition 1 (ii) for 6/ (√3−3) ≤ γ < γ∗. Note that Lemma 6 holds also when
6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < γ∗, as the first part of its proof is sufficient to cover the whole interval (0, α̂]
when α̂ < α˜; the only tool required is Lemma 9, which, as a matter of fact, does apply for all
6/
(√
3− 3) ≤ γ < −2. Thus, Corollary 2 still applies and states that f can have, if any, at most
one maximum point in (0, α̂]. Lemma 11 establishes that the function f is strictly concave on [α̂, α˜],
where α˜ ≤ 1. As long as α˜ < 1, Corollary 1 and Lemma 4 (iii) together state that both φ and ψ have
16Recall that, by Lemma 8, γ∗ < 2/
(
1−√3).
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positive third derivative on [α˜, 1], and thus f ′′′ > 0 on [α˜, 1] accordingly.17 Finally, Lemma 7 covers
the interval [1,+∞) by establishing that, if condition (21) holds true, the set {α ≥ 1 : f (α) ≤ 0} is
always a nonempty (nontrivial) closed interval.
Therefore, if 1) f can have at most one maximum point in (0, α̂], 2) f is strictly concave on [α̂, α˜],
3) f ′′′ > 0 on [α˜, 1] whenever α˜ < 1 and 4) the set {α ≥ 1 : f (α) ≤ 0} is a closed interval, then the
behavior of f is that described in the proof of Proposition 1 (i) also when 6/ (√3− 3) ≤ γ < γ∗,
and the proof is complete. Recall that under condition (21) the solution set of system (26) is always
nonempty.
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